Thomas Hobbes, który badaniu języka poświęcił wiele miejsca, zastanawiał się, czy możliwe jest myślenie — myślenie w ogóle i myślenie abstrakcyjne — bez języka? Hobbes zakładał, że ludzie pozbawieni języka mogą tworzyć własne, niedoskonałe, prywatne języki, pozwalające im na swoiście rozumiane rozumowanie. Na Hobbesowskie pytanie trzysta lat później odpowiada twierdząco wybitny neurolog i literat Oliver Sacks. Na podstawie danych, jakie przyniosła mu praca z osobami głuchymi, nieznającymi żadnego, nawet migowego, języka, dowodzi, że słowa i inne znaki umowne stają się niezbędne (...) dopiero na pewnym etapie procesu myślowego, że myśl jest czymś znacznie szerszym niż słowo, że można — w pewnym sensie — myśleć bez słów. Jak wcześniej Hobbes, Sacks podkreśla, że myślenie, w którym nie korzysta się z powszechnie przyjętych znaków, ma jednak charakter ułomny i niepełny; myślenie takie nie znajduje uzewnętrznienia, izoluje jednostkę z życia w społeczeństwie. (shrink)

According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sophisticated, and plausible (...) version of direct doxastic voluntarism. On Kierkegaard’s view, when we take ourselves to be in an epistemically permissive situation, we have the ability to form outright beliefs (but not credences) at will in virtue of our ability to voluntarily 1) open or close inquiry and 2) determine our attitude towards epistemic risk. (shrink)

On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with (...) epistemic rationality by determining which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all‐things‐considered adopt. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief‐credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds that (...) beliefs and credences (i.e., degrees of belief) are two irreducibly distinct types of mental states. Beliefs are resolutions that close inquiry, thereby excluding doubt and reflecting subjective certainty by disregarding the possibility of error. Credences, by contrast, reflect assessments of evidential probabilities, thereby encoding a recognition of “objective uncertainty” by acknowledging the possibility of error. In addition to solving a vexing interpretive puzzle and showing how Kierkegaard anticipates contemporary views about the nature of belief and credence, this paper demonstrates that Kierkegaard developed a sophisticated account of the nature of belief, doubt, and certainty that merits serious philosophical consideration. (shrink)

According to the thesis of doxastic wronging, our beliefs can non-derivatively wrong others. A recent criticism of this view claims that proponents of the doxastic wronging thesis have no principled grounds for denying that credences can likewise non-derivatively wrong, so they must countenance pervasive conflicts between morality and epistemic rationality. This paper defends the thesis of doxastic wronging from this objection by arguing that belief bears distinctive relationships to inquiry and blame that can explain why beliefs, but not credences, can (...) non-derivatively wrong. First, forming a belief (but not updating one’s credence) closes inquiry, and suspending judgment (but not updating one’s credence) opens inquiry. Consequently, beliefs can distinctively wrong others by prematurely closing inquiry or inappropriately opening inquiry. Second, beliefs (but not credences) can constitute blame. Unfittingly blaming someone can wrong them, and hence beliefs which constitute unfitting blame can distinctively wrong. In addition to defending the claim that only beliefs can non-derivatively wrong, this paper gestures towards an ethics of belief which attends to the relationship between belief and attitudes such as inquiry, faith, trust, and blame. (shrink)

What do we know about Hegel? What do we know about Marx? What do we know about democracy and totalitarianism? Communism and psychoanalysis? What do we know that isn't a platitude that we've heard a thousand times - or a self-satisfied certainty? Through his brilliant reading of Hegel, Slavoj Zizek - one of the most provocative and widely-read thinkers of our time - upends our traditional understanding, dynamites every cliché and undermines every conviction in order to clear the ground for (...) new ways of answering these questions. When Lacan described Hegel as the ‘most sublime hysteric’, he was referring to the way that the hysteric asks questions because he experiences his own desire as if it were the Other's desire. In the dialectical process, the question asked of the Other is resolved through a reflexive turn in which the question begins to function as its own answer. We had made Hegel into the theorist of abstraction and reaction, but by reading Hegel with Lacan, Zizek unveils a Hegel of the concrete and of revolution - his own, and the one to come. This early and dazzlingly original work by Zizek offers a unique insight into the ideas which have since become hallmarks of his mature thought. It will be of great interest to anyone interested in critical theory, philosophy and contemporary social thought. (shrink)

Donald Davidson has made enormous contributions to the philosophy of action, epistemology, semantics and philosophy of mind and today is recognized as one of the most important analytical philosophers of the late twentieth century. _Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge_ addresses * Davidson's writings on epistemology and theory of language with their implications of ontology and philosophy of mind * the central issue of whether truth is the ultimate goal of enquiry, challenged by contributions from Richard Rorty and Paul Horwich (...) * Davidson's approach to semantics and applied linguistics as addressed by Kirk Ludwig, Gabriel Segal, Peter Pagin, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore and Reinaldo Elugardo * Davidson's advances in the philosophy of mind in relation to the views of Williard V. Quine, John McDowell and Peter F. Strawson, in essays by Roger Gibson and Anita Avramides. (shrink)

Donald Davidson has made enormous contributions to the philosophy of action, epistemology, semantics and philosophy of mind and today is recognized as one of the most important analytical philosophers of the late twentieth century. _Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge_ addresses * Davidson's writings on epistemology and theory of language with their implications of ontology and philosophy of mind * the central issue of whether truth is the ultimate goal of enquiry, challenged by contributions from Richard Rorty and Paul Horwich (...) * Davidson's approach to semantics and applied linguistics as addressed by Kirk Ludwig, Gabriel Segal, Peter Pagin, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore and Reinaldo Elugardo * Davidson's advances in the philosophy of mind in relation to the views of Williard V. Quine, John McDowell and Peter F. Strawson, in essays by Roger Gibson and Anita Avramides. (shrink)

Olivera Cadahia, Luciana; Carrasco-Conde, Ana. Fuera de sí mismas. Motivos para dislocarse. Herder. 399 páginas.

In his paper, ‘The Aroma of Coffee’, H. O. Mounce wants to expose what he takes to be a deep prejudice in philosophy, one which is at work in our culture more generally. Philosophers are reluctant to admit that there is anything which passes beyond human understanding. Of course, they are quite ready to admit that there are plenty of things that they fail to understand but this they would say simply happens to be the case. It does not mean (...) that what they fail to understand is something which is beyond human understanding. Thus even when they fail to understand something, that ‘something’ remains, in principle, within the reach of their understanding. For Mounce this prejudice flies in the face of what is platitudinously obvious: that there is much that passes beyond human understanding. (shrink)

On Islamic philosophy with special reference to logic in Islamic philosophy.

The necessity of the study of mistakes of bilingual students in the use of nominal parts of speech is grounded in the article, it provides valuable material for scientific and methodological conclusions, as these mistakes reflect linguistic, psychological and pedagogical aspects that affect the ability of schoolchildren to learn peculiarities of using nominal parts of speech of Russian language. In this regard, ascertaining experiment with pupils of schools with native teaching language was held. Students were offered the tasks based on (...) formation of the four types of competence: language, linguistic, communicative and cultural. The results of the experiment made possible to reveal numerous mistakes in using nominal parts of speech in oral speech and in writing of students. These mistakes are a consequence of the complexity of semantic and grammatical nature of the names in the Russian language, of interfering influence of the native language and as well are explained by the imperfection of the content and methods of teaching nominal parts of speech at school. (shrink)

“Let me begin with the standard stupid question: if I were allowed to take only one piece of music to a lone island, which one this would be? [...]”.

“Today, the first notes of a popular baroque piece like Pachelbel's Canon are automatically perceived as the accompaniment, so that we wait for the moment when the melody proper will emerge; since we get no melody but only a more and more intricate polyphonic variation of the melodic accompaniment, we somehow feel "deceived". Where does this horizon of expectation, which sustains our feeling that the melody proper is missing, come from?” An extract on music from Slavoj Žižek’s new book on (...) Hegel to be published in autumn 2017. (shrink)

Oświecenia nie byłoby bez zwrotu w stronę rozumu, a ten nie jest żadną ideą, lecz własnością nader pospolitą – już sto lat wcześniej René Descartes powiadał, że nikt nie uskarża się na jego brak. Osiemnastowieczni filozofowie bodajże po raz pierwszy problematyzują owo nikt, pytając o rozum dzieci, „dzikich”, sawantów, geniuszy, wynalazców, szaleńców, ba – kobiet (dziewczynek, dziewcząt), aktualnych i przyszłych matek „rodu ludzkiego”, a nie tylko o „rozum ludzki”. Ma on zresztą wiele postaci – common sense, zdrowy rozum (rozsądek), „chłopski (...) rozum”, rozum praktyczny, czysty, spekulatywny itd., a także granicę, którą jest utrata rozumu lub zmysłów. Zawsze jednak objawia się wśród ludzi, pośród ludzkich spraw, bez względu na to, czy aktualnie należymy do jakiejś wspólnoty, czy – jak w pewnym momencie Robinson Crusoe albo Denis Diderot – zostaliśmy z niej czasowo wyłączeni. Epoka rozumu, jak zwykło się w skrócie charakteryzować „optymistyczne” Oświecenie, dostrzegała i eksponowała jego faktyczność i jednostkowość – rozum jest zawsze i tylko czyjąśdyspozycją – nie tracąc przy tym z oczu innej jego niezbywalnej cechy: powszechności. Wszystko może nas dzielić – pochodzenie, język, religia, płeć, zamożność, zdrowie, wykształcenie czy upodobania, lecz taki sam i ten sam jest mój i twój rozum. Tom prezentuje wyniki badań nad filozofią Oświecenia prowadzonych w wielu ośrodkach naukowych w kraju. Tym, co łączy wszystkie pomieszczone w nim teksty, jest zwrócenie uwagi na oświeceniowe rozumienie społecznej natury człowieka. Autorzy przedstawiają jej różne aspekty: od funkcjonowania instytucji służących prowadzeniu i upowszechnianiu badań naukowych, przez osiemnastowieczne projekty edukacyjne, kształtowanie się ówczesnych gustów estetycznych i znaczenie przykładane do języków narodowych, aż po społeczny wymiar medycyny. Prace te nie tylko ukazują, jak bardzo złożony jest obraz Oświecenia, ale też przypominają, że depozytariuszami opiewanego w tej epoce rozumu jesteśmy my – poszczególni ludzie, a jego funkcjonowanie wymaga istnienia rozmaitych łączących nas więzi. (shrink)